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Abstract
This study examines the relationship of perceived corruption in Ukraine and the factors
that influence that perception. In particular, this paper investigates the idea that an influential
Russian presence affects the perception of governmental corruption amongst Ukrainian business
owners and managers. An Ordered Logistic Regression is utilized to estimate how business
ownership and business environment characteristics affect the likelihood of how severely
corruption is perceived. Using a sample of 1207 respondents from the Business Environment and
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) obtained by the European Bank of Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), a combination of quantitative and qualitative variables is utilized.
Speaking Russian at work in Ukraine has a weak but positive statistically significant effect on
the severity of perceived corruption within the government. Working in industries such as
chemical, construction, wholesale, and transportation has a strong statistically significant impact
on the severity of perceived corruption of respondents within these sectors. In comparison,
working in white-collar industries such as electronics and information technology shows no
evidence of affecting perception of corruption. In addition, the percentage of a business that is
foreign-owned affects the likelihood of how severely corruption is perceived, while the size of a
business and the size of the city in which it is located have no effect. This paper also evaluates
how these coefficients change when looking at Russian-speaking Ukrainians versus Ukrainianspeaking Ukrainians.
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Introduction
Corruption is the unlawful or immoral misuse of public resources by government officials
for personal or illegal gain. Although the meaning of corruption can vary greatly from institution
to institution or person to person, corruption has generally been looked upon as a detriment to the
economy and society as a whole. Corruption can take many forms such as bribery, extortion,
time-wasting, dishonesty, or self-service to misuse public resources. Due to the difficulty in
measuring and acquiring data on such an illicit topic, this paper examines the perception of
corruption as a proxy for corruption.
In addition to the obvious moral concerns, it is important to eliminate the perception of
corruption within a country’s government in order to increase the trust of its citizens and of
foreign governments. Diplomacy and politics appear more predictable and stable both within
domestic political parties and with foreign governments with the reduction of perceived
corruption.
In order to begin the process of eliminating perceived corruption we must first understand
its causes. When examining Ukraine, we must consider the presence of Russian influence as a
determinant of perceived corruption of Ukraine’s government. This influence is embedded
within the psyche of Ukrainian culture today through media, economics, and politics. In addition
to navigating the Russian influence, Ukraine has had to manage the tumultuous changes within
its own history; ranging from the times of the Crimean Hordes, to the Kievan Rus, to the
incorporation into the U.S.S.R and its return to independence. The dynamic between Russia and
Ukraine has created a tense and uncertain future for the latter as many of its politicians and
policymakers are caught between Western and Russian values.

4

According to Transparency International, a global organization that measures and ranks
national perceived corruption, in 2014 Ukraine had the 33rd highest perception of corruption out
of 174 participating countries. Within that same index, it only scored one point lower (26) on a
hundred-point scale than its former socialist republic sister Russia (27). Figure 1 shows how
Ukraine’s perception of corruption has changed from 2008 to 2014, illustrating that Ukraine has
had very little success in changing its perceived corruption over those 7 years. The lack of
improvement in this low rating suggests that market and government reforms have failed to
become more transparent. Other former socialist republics of the U.S.S.R such as Moldova,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia all ranked better than Ukraine in perceived corruption
in 2014. In addition to having similar government and economic structures when compared to
these countries, Ukraine also has several unique factors beneficial to economic growth, such as
proximity to the European Union, easy access to the Mediterranean Sea through the Black Sea
and Bosporus Sea, and its former role as the U.S.S.R industrial zone. This raises the question as
to why Ukraine, despite these seemingly beneficial factors, has had such poor economic growth.
According to the World Bank, the annual GDP per capita growth rates in Ukraine for 2012,
2013, and 2014 were 0.239%, -0.027%, and -6.553% respectively. The high perception of
corruption in Ukraine as reported by Transparency International may suggest that government
inefficiencies negatively influence the rate of economic reform and thus economic growth.
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Figure 1: Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2008-2014
Year

Score (Base 100, 100 is no
perceived corruption)

Year over Year % change in
score

2008

25

-

2009

22

-12%

2010

24

9.09%

2011

23

-4.17%

2012

26

13.04%

2013

25

-3.85%

2014

26

4%

Source: Transparency.org

In recent history, Ukraine has experienced notable governmental change with the
intention to establish growth in its economy. Whitmore (2014) notes that Ukraine has changed or
readopted its constitution several times since its independence from the U.S.S.R in 1991. While a
country going through such a radical government transition would be expected to make political
and policy changes, too many constitutional changes in a very short time period can create
uncertainty and unpredictability. Unpredictability continues to be a factor in society as Ukraine
moves away from the policies of its former centralized government and transitions into an openmarket economy. Since Ukraine gained independence from the U.S.S.R, the westernization of its
economy after years of socialism has caused the GDP per capita to drop by over 50%. 1 Figure 2
shows Ukraine’s GDP per capita from 1991 to 2014. The huge decline and slow recovery of
GDP per capita has caused economic unpredictability and civil unrest. As Ukraine looks to shed
the remnants of its planned economy and grow its four-digit U.S. dollar GDP per capita, it is
imperative for policy-makers to reduce this uncertainty and unpredictability. Some Ukrainians
1

Source: The World Bank. “Ukraine.” The World Bank Data, The World Bank, 2018,
data.worldbank.org/country/ukraine?view=chart.
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believe that realigning their interests with Russia will best serve their country and bring forward
economic stability. This is illustrated by the ongoing rebellion in Luhansk and Donetsk backed
by pro-Russian rebels. Other Ukrainians feel that closer economic ties with Europe will help
repair their stagnating economy. In 2013, pro-European Ukrainians took to the streets in the
Maidan Square protest to display their dissatisfaction with the pro-Russian government and
former President Yanukovych’s intention to solidify their dependence on Russia; this ultimately
forced him from office. Soon after, Russia annexed Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014 claiming that it
was the will of the Russian speakers to return to Russia’s sovereignty. These events fueled the
discord amongst the pro-Russian and pro-European Ukrainians. Such conflicts have deep-rooted
complexities that delve into Ukraine’s history, culture, geography and diplomacy that can affect
how the citizens feel their government is performing. Rational citizens then react according to
how they expect their government and economy to perform. Therefore, the perception of
corruption in this time of uncertainty is vital for determining Ukraine’s short-term economic
growth.
Figure 2: GDP per capita in constant 2010 USD

Source: World Bank
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The perception of corruption can have lasting effects on a country’s government, varying
from country to country, but this study aims to specifically examine which factors influence that
perceived corruption within Ukrainian businesses. Specifically, we use individual level data
obtained by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to identify which factors
contribute to business managers’ perception of corruption in the Ukrainian government.
Although the data acquired is from a niche sample of the population, it gives us the ability to
examine perceived corruption from those in the business sector. Thus, the main focus of this
paper is to determine whether Russian influence is among one of the many factors that alter
one’s perception of corruption.
As it is difficult to directly account for Russia’s influence on the Ukrainian society, we
make the assumption that those who speak Russian are more likely to be influenced by Russian
culture, media, politics, and ideals. There has been evidence demonstrating that those who speak
Russian abroad will be a focus of Russian foreign policy. President Putin of Russia has publicly
stated that it is his duty to protect Russian speakers no matter where they reside. This is one of
the ways he justified Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Such actions do not guarantee that Russian
speakers are influenced by Russia; however, Russian is spoken throughout Ukraine as one of its
official languages. Therefore, this study uses Russian language as a proxy for Russian influence.
The first section of the paper reviews the previous literature on perceived corruption and
how it ties into economic growth. Section two explains the data and type of test that is used in
this study. Section three derives an equation from previous studies. Section four takes a brief
look at the raw results of the paper. Section five contains an analysis of the results and what steps
can be taken to reduce perceived corruption in Ukraine. Finally, section six offers a conclusion to
the study.
8

I.

Previous Literature
The effect corruption has on an economy has been studied with ambiguous findings.

Mauro (1995) finds evidence that a more efficient bureaucracy tends to lead to an increase in
investment inflows. Mauro created this bureaucratic efficiency index (BI) to standardize how
well a government performs its duties. Mauro notes that while a low BI score does not
exclusively mean corruption is the problem, a high amount of corruption can cause a low BI
score. Levine and Renelt (1992), along with many others such as Root and Ahmed (1979), and
Borensztein et al. (1997), find that investment inflows such as foreign direct investment (FDI)
increase economic growth. This growth can occur by eliminating market barriers, incentivizing
technological growth, and/or allowing the creation of more competition. Mauro’s assessment of
efficient governments and increased investment flows, paired with the finding that an increased
investment inflow rate tends to increase economic growth can lead us to conclude that sustained
levels of corruption can indirectly lower the overall economic growth rate. Research done by
Azman-Saini et al. (2010) adds that a certain threshold of technology and human development
must be present in the country for foreign or domestic investment to have a positive impact on
economic growth. Ukraine is not far behind the West in terms of access to technology; there are
1.4 mobile telephone subscriptions per citizen, indicating that nearly all of its citizens have
access to mobile phones, and approximately half its citizens have internet access. However,
Ukraine’s Human Development Index (HDI) provided by the UN indicates that it may not be at
the necessary threshold as it ranks 84th out of 194 countries and has consistently stayed near this
level since 1991.2 Given this mediocre level of HDI, Ukraine has incentives to increase its

2

Source: Jahan, Selim. “Human Development Reports: Ukraine.” 2014 Human Development Report,
United Nations Development Programme, 2015, hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/UKR#
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overall human development in order to attract more investment as well as increase the marginal
benefit of those investments. Figure 3 shows the change in payments of FDI into Ukraine, GDP
per capita growth, and change in perceived corruption from 2008-2014. Ukraine’s geopolitical
affairs have caused volatile shifts in FDI while GDP per capita and perceived corruption have
barely fluctuated. A potential solution to a more reliable inflow of FDI is to increase its BI by
reducing the amount of perceived corruption in its government.
Figure 3: Percentage Change in FDI, GDP per capita, Corruption

Source: World Bank, Transparency International.

In order to get a more complete picture of corruption we must acknowledge that in
certain circumstances corruption may be efficient for a particular institution. Papers from
Dzhumashev (2014) and Huang (2015) dispute, in part, that corruption always inhibits economic
growth and in fact find evidence that there are levels of corruption that can be optimal for
government efficiency. Dzhumashev makes the case for corruption existing in government to the
extent in which it mitigates complex institutions and serves as a tool to bypass inefficient red
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tape. For example, a business that wants to build infrastructure may pay off a local official in
order to sidestep building permits and legal building codes required by a slow, ineffective, or
distant government to formally approve their plans so that it may enter the market more quickly.
In these instances, it may be economically or bureaucratically efficient to tolerate systematic
corruption. Corruption can be used to lessen the weight of heavy-handed governments that have
grown too large to operate efficiently. Huang used cross-country analysis to determine that even
a country as developed and democratic as South Korea can become more bureaucratically
efficient with a sustained level of corruption. This “greasing the wheels” example runs counter to
the argument that all corruption should be eliminated for the benefit of economic efficiency.
Outside of the institutional realm, corruption can be viewed as a problem that moral
citizens would like to eliminate on principle. If left unchecked within an institution, corruption
can become pervasive and accepted over time. In a two-player individual pay off game, Ghatak
and Iyengar (2014) suggest corrupt behavior by one player can influence others to act corruptly.
This leads to a feedback effect, whereby initial corruption or perceived corruption continues to
thrive or even grow. While in reality, there are often more than two players and a wide variety of
different types of “games”. Ghatak’s and Iyengar’s findings can still apply by the same process
and reasoning as the two-player pay off game. In a government that has allowed corrupt officials
to work in public office, corruption could become a phenomenon or possibly increase in severity
if steps to deter it are not put into place. Morris (2006) investigates whether or not there is a
variation in perceived corruption within Mexican states. Our paper follows a similar approach in
the context of Ukraine. His findings show that traditional macroeconomic characteristics such as
income growth, economic development, and federal direct investment as well as individual
characteristics such as schooling, ethnicity, and interpersonal trust did not alter the perception of
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corruption over a span of three years. He does, however, find that the perception of corruption in
previous years was significant in determining the perception of corruption in later years. This
empirical finding from Morris agrees with the theoretical work of Ghatak and Iyengar suggesting
that previously perceived corruption can influence future perceptions.
Corrupt behavior can coerce others into acting corruptly if there is a system in place that
allows it to occur and continue. Levine and Satarov (2000) examine how institutional norms and
organizational and political culture allow corruption to exist in Russia. They suggest that implicit
attitudes and understandings exist amongst public officials that are conducive to allowing
corruption and bribery to take place. They also illustrate the complexities of how politicians
insert themselves into private businesses, creating a dynamic that often mixes political
backchanneling with business deals. For example, a business that requires recurring drilling
permits may build a relationship with a public official who personally benefits from fast tracking
drilling permits. This could happen within an institution as well, driven by a combination of the
institution’s lack of law enforcement and employees who do not want to disrupt the acceptable
status quo. During a short-term period, whether in game theory or reality, it’s possible that
corrupt behavior can create future corrupt behavior purely by influencing others’ actions.
Without a mechanism or process to address the perpetuation of corruption, this behavior can
become fully sustained resulting in long-term corruption.
Shleifer and Vishy (1993) conclude that weak and transitioning central governments are
more susceptible to costly corruption. They use an example in post-communist Russia where a
foreigner (non-Russian) who tries to invest in a Russian business has to pay bribes to institutions
throughout the entire investment process (such as minister of industry, foreign investment office,
executive branch and so on). This type of corruption reduces incentives for foreigners to invest in
12

that country. A cohesive federal government will be elusive if branches of central government
act independently and unilaterally. Institutions who act to further their own self-interest without
transparency or interference from other agencies allow bribery and corruption to thrive. This is
evident in Ukraine where the federal government is in the midst of a slow transition and
corruption still appears to be a problem. The corruption and bribery that fuel this process is likely
to perpetuate corruption until a transitioning government can show it will protect foreign and
domestic investors. If the government lacks central authority, accountability, and transparency,
then current corruption can be an indicator of future corruption.
While it appears that the Ukrainian government has failed to implement proper reforms to
shift the economy to a more decentralized market, it has created some opportunities for
entrepreneurship. Businesses could fill the gaps in the economy where the central government
has failed (Smallbone, Welter, Voytovich, & Egorov 2009).3 When the government begins
transitioning from a planned economy to an open market it creates a new paradigm. Smallbone et
al. explains that there is potential for black markets that existed during the planned economy to
become legitimate and enter into the free market. It is in the nature of change that some
industries and businesses will adapt to the transition while others will fail or become irrelevant.
The struggles of some private industries compared to the success of others have the potential to
create opposing viewpoints among Ukrainians on the business environment and economic
transition process.
Along with opportunities for entrepreneurship, economic and government reforms also
bring new challenges. Blake and Morris (2009) note that with open market reforms and the
democratization of government, there can be new areas and opportunities for corruption to occur.
3

For example, a state-run distribution center turned privately owned.
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They also suggest that a longer and slower reform process may also give rise to corrupt practices.
As a symptom of a long transition, the demand for accountability and transparency fails to
adhere as complacency sets in for citizens and institutions, creating a new breeding ground for
corruption. This is in line with Braguinsky (1996) who suggests that corruption in capitalist
environments is transitory in that corrupt events ebb and flow as the market and policies catch up
with the demands of agents. In comparison, a more controlled market or totalitarian environment
produces long-term corruption that becomes systemic. The logic behind Braguinsky’s finding
suggests that when an open-market economy demands equilibrium revolving around constantly
changing factors, those who exhibit corrupt behavior must constantly adapt to hide from the
procedures, laws, and institutions that evolve with the changing economy. In contrast, a
totalitarian environment does not encourage change within the government and a planned market
requires massive policy shifts in order to change the dynamic of the economy. This is conducive
to long-term corruption, where it can be sustained and does not have a reason to be addressed.
In addition to identifying systematic factors that contribute to the perception of
corruption, there are individual factors that may contribute as well. Swamy (2001) ignites a
debate over gender and corruption during an era where women are still trying to reach equality in
the majority of the world. He suggests that more women in government office leads to less
bribery given certain economic conditions. Wangnerud (2011) builds on this premise set by
Swamy and takes it a step further, showing evidence that women are inherently less corrupt. If
gender has an effect on corruption, an argument could be made that other implicit individual
characteristics can play a role in determining how we perceive corruption.
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II.

Data
The data used in this study was provided by the European Bank for Reconstruction and

Development (EBRD). The dataset contains information from surveys sent to businesses to get
an overall measurement of qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the economy. The
survey used is called the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, also
referred to as the BEEPS. The BEEPS has been performed in five waves, allowing access to data
from different time periods. This study uses panel data that combines BEEP IV-V, the two most
recent waves of the survey that was distributed between 2012 and 2014 and reflects data from
that time range. BEEPS is an expansive dataset that provides industry level data and gives
researchers access to information that is obtained from thousands of individual sources. This
study uses a sample of 1207 survey respondents consisting of business managers and owners in
Ukraine.
The BEEPS diversity and depth of information allows researchers to answer questions
that have previously been difficult to answer empirically. It contains questions that cover topics
related to corruption, productivity, demographics, and business environment. In an illicit topic
such as corruption, the BEEPS provides consistent and standardized data which allows
researchers to examine corruption with accuracy and consistency. Papers such as De Rosa et al.
(2010) use the BEEPS to determine the effect of bribes (“bribe tax”) on productivity compared to
the effect of following the proper channels of government (“time tax”) on productivity. Using
cross-country analysis, they find that the bribe tax has a negative impact on a country’s
productivity while the time tax has no effect. They also find the bribe tax is more harmful to
European Union (EU) countries when compared to non-EU countries. This suggests that
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economic conditions and macroeconomic policy do in fact affect how corruption impacts the
economy.
Blagojevic and Damijan (2013) also use the BEEPS II-IV panel data, which combines
three waves of BEEPs from 2002-2009, to determine how demographic ownership affects how
likely a business is to partake in informal bribery. They suggest that foreign-owned businesses
benefit from bribery more than domestic-owned businesses. Similarly, Bondarev (2014) uses the
BEEPS II-IV dataset to perform a maximum likelihood regression on an instrumental variable
for foreign-ownership to find that a relationship exists between foreign-ownership of businesses
in Ukraine and perceived corruption.

III.

Methodology
An ordered logistic regression method (Ologit, a procedure in STATA) and a variety of

factor variables are used to determine the effect of Russia’s influence on the severity of
perceived corruption of Ukraine’s government. The analysis measures how specific variables
affect the likelihood of each of the five degrees of corruption, ranging from none (0) to severe
(4). Appendix I shows the distributions of perceived corruptions from the BEEPS IV-V panel
data.
The estimation equation is based on a combination of results from previous studies and
current events happening in Ukraine. Before assembling the equation, the following statements
should be considered:
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1. “Perceived corruption”, the dependent variable in this study, is used as proxy for actual
corruption. Corruption in its truest form can be incredibly hard to directly measure as it is
very subjective and abstract.
2. Although the definition of corruption can vary by respondent, their answers reflect a
standardized measure of perceived corruption (i.e. none, minor, moderate, major, severe).
The survey measures the severity of corruption by asking how it affects each
respondent’s day-to-day business operations.
3. The perceptions of business owners and managers are assumed to represent how
corruption impacts the business and economic environment. While this does not best
represent the full scope of all corruption, it should provide a relatively more precise
reflection of the economic impacts of perceived corruption.
4. This paper measures how likely a respondent is to perceive corruption of the Ukrainian
government on a scale from 0 (none) to 4 (severe). For analysis purposes, this paper
assumes that the more severely respondents are impacted by corruption, the more likely
they are to perceive the government as corrupt.
5. Ukraine has two primary languages; Ukrainian and Russian. The language in which each
respondent spoke during the survey was recorded as either the local language (Ukrainian)
or Russian. This information was utilized to obtain the Russian language variable. In this
paper the base language is Ukrainian and the dummy variable is set to 1 when a
respondent speaks to Russian.
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-Dependent Variable
This model will build on previous studies to identify which factors affect perceived
corruption. Our dependent variable, perceived corruption, is measured by severity and answers
the question “how severe of an obstacle is corruption to your day-to-day operations?” As
illustrated in consideration #2 from the Methodology section, this survey question provides a
standardized way to measure respondents’ general assessment of corruption without having
specific insight on the inner-workings of government.
-Control Variables
Dollar et al. (2001) investigates a controversial factor in determining perceived
corruption: Does the gender of those in public office affect the perceived corruption of that
office? In this niche area of study, they determined that gender does affect corruption. Their
cross-country analysis shows that when more women are elected into office there is less
perceived corruption. Swamy, Knack, Lee, & Azar (2001) reinforces this premise in his findings
that an increased female presence within the government lowers the incidence of bribery when
specific economic conditions are met. In a more recent study, Esarey & Chirillo (2013) performs
cross-country analysis to look at a gender’s impact on corruption and finds that it varies
depending on an institution’s cultural and social norms. The data utilized in our estimation
equation does not include the gender of the respondent but does include a dummy variable that
represents whether females have a stake in the respondent’s business. This dummy variable will
act as a control for inherent attitudes or perceptions within a business brought about by its female
owner(s). In addition to female ownership, a variable to account for the percentage of a business
that is foreign-owned is used in the estimation equation. If female owners have an impact on
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perceived corruption due to some inherent quality, then a similar argument can be made for
foreign owners.
Since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, the country’s parliamentary election process has
changed seven times (Whitmore 2014). As stated in the introduction, Whitmore points out that
there have been numerous constitutional changes and re-adoptions that have contributed to
political instability. The BEEPS evaluated the respondent’s answers in relation to how severely
political instability impacts their day-to-day business operations. This variable, political
instability, is utilized in the estimation equation. It can be interpreted in a variety of ways and is
left to the respondent to determine how it affects their business operations. Political instability is
measured on the same scale as our dependent variable ranging from none (0) to severe (4).
Taxes are one of the more pervasive factors that can affect an economy. The estimation
equation includes the perceived effect of tax rates on daily business operations as a control
variable. This controls for the respondent’s perspective on how mandatory factors such as tax
rates affect their daily business operations versus subversive factors such as political instability.
The variable for tax rates is in the same format as our dependent variable. Respondents were
asked to evaluate how severely tax rates affect their day-to-day business operations and they
provide an answer ranging from none (0) to severe (4).
Although Wangnerud (2011) focuses on determining the impact of gender on corruption,
her model also includes population as a contributing factor in determining the variation of
corruption. The BEEPS dataset provides a range of population for the city in which a business is
located. In addition to the geographical population, the estimation equation will also include a
variable that accounts for the size of the business (number of employees). The use of this
variable can be viewed in two ways. Firstly, the size of a business may influence the frequency
19

of interactions with public officials and secondly, the size of a business may impact perception of
how corruption affects an individual within that business.
The final control variable in this estimation equation is the type of industry in which the
respondent is employed. The industry variable is included to control for industry-specific
practices and behaviors that impact its relationship with the Ukrainian government. For example,
a mining company that regularly needs to obtain licenses for drilling, the food industry that
interacts with health inspectors annually, or the shipping industry that decides to put its
headquarters near the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine may all have
varying levels of government interactions that influence their perceptions of corruption.
The equation estimated using maximum likelihood is:
corruption = β0 + Χ1 β1+ χ2 β2 + χ3 β3+ χ4 β4+ χ5 β5+ μi
where the dependent variable is severity of perceived corruption and βn is the coefficient of its
corresponding χn variable; Χ1 is a vector of indicator variables that include type of industry, size
of the city of the business location, the severity of effect of tax rates on business operations, the
severity of effect of political instability on business operations; χ2 is number of employees a
business; χ3 is a dummy variable for Russian language, the variable used to determine if there
exists a Russian influence on corruption; χ4 is a dummy variable for any degree of female
ownership; χ5 is the percentage of business foreign-owned; and μi is the error term. A list of the
variables and their statistical means are listed in Table 1. Since ordered logistic regression
measures likelihood, it measures the change in likelihood relative to a given set of circumstances.
All of the variables in this paper are formatted so that the data is reported linearly by magnitude
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or is a dummy, with the exception of industry, which is categorical and all measurements of
industry are relative to non-specialized manufacturing sector.

IV.

Results
Table 2 shows initial results. A condition of using this ordered logistic regression

technique is that it’s output is not interpretable in terms of a specific coefficient’s magnitude and
direction. However, we can see which variables are statistically significant. Compared to the
base perceived corruption of a non-specialized manufacturing company, there are a number of
industries that are statistically more likely to view corruption differently, with construction,
transportation, and wholesale having a p-value of 0.01 or less. Political instability, tax rates, and
percentage of foreign ownership are also below the 0.01 p-value. Our main variable, Russian
language is significant at the 0.10 level.
In order to determine the variable’s effect on the likelihood of perceived corruption, there
needs to be a calculation of the average marginal effect (AME). This will create an interpretable
average effect of each variable across all possible dependent variable outcomes. The AME for all
control variables can be found in Table 3. The AME in this study is calculated at the means of
each variable.
Overall, the Russian language variable has a p-value below 0.10, which is weakly
significant. It’s average marginal effect is 0.0233. This means that a Russian-speaking
respondent is 2.33% more likely to report a higher level of corruption in the Ukrainian
government. Additionally, tax rates and political instability have a strong statistically significant
and negative effect on the severity of perceived corruption. This indicates that an increase in the
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level of severity of the effects of tax rate or political instability lowers the likelihood that
corruption affects their day-to-day business operations. An increase in a level of severity of the
effects of tax rate and political instability reported by each respondent decreases the likelihood of
reporting a higher level of corruption by 0.0535 and 0.0785 respectively.
Notably, the dummy variable for female ownership is not statistically significant while
the foreign-ownership variable is significant at the 0.01 level. For every percentage point
increase in foreign-ownership, it is 0.09% less likely that the respondent will report a higher
level of corruption. This is notable because it may indicate that environmental factors such as
where an individual was raised and their cultural upbringing may affect one's expectation of
corruption, while inherent factors such as gender may not. This result may be specific to Ukraine
where societal expectations and the institutionalization of women are different than in other
countries, as Morris (2009) and Wangnerud (2011) pointed out.
The type of industry a respondent works in impacts their perceived corruption. The most
statistically significant industries are transportation (-0.1548 AME), chemicals (-0.1380 AME),
construction (-0.1084 AME), and wholesale (-0.1005 AME). These industries are statistically
significant in relation to a non-specialized manufacturing business.
Table 3 also lists the AME of each variable when Russian language is set to 0 and 1. One
variable that stands out is the percentage of a business that is foreign-owned. When the Russian
language dummy variable is set to 1, the AME of percentage of business foreign-owned is 0.0008 while when Russian language is set to 0, the AME is -0.0009. It can be extrapolated that
the expectations of corruption of those businesses that are foreign-owned may be determined by
external factors. The upbringing, experience, and morals of foreign business owners may bestow
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different organizational culture and expectations on their businesses that are independent of
Russia’s influence on Ukraine.
In Table 3, there is a notable difference in the AME between Russian speakers and
Ukrainian speakers when comparing the effect of political instability on perceived corruption.
An increase in the severity of the effect of political instability reported decreases the Russian
speaker’s likelihood to perceive a higher level of corruption by 0.0729, while the likelihood for
Ukrainian speakers decreases by 0.0803. This implies that if a Russian speaker and a Ukrainian
speaker perceive there to be the same amount of political instability, the Russian speaker is more
likely to perceive the government as more corrupt.

V. Analysis
Despite reform efforts by Ukrainian citizens such as the Orange Revolution of 2004 and
the Euromaidan Protest in 2013, Ukraine’s government has been stubbornly ineffective in
following through on implementing anti-corruption measures (Herbst 2017). The European
Union has encouraged Ukraine to crackdown on corruption and has asked them to signed an
Association Agreement.4 This push to end corruption shows that many observers inside and
outside of Ukraine view corruption as a factor that produces inefficiency, lowers investment, and
must be reduced to ensure long-term economic growth.

4

Source: Emmott, Robin. “What is Ukraine’s Association Agreement with the EU?” Thomas Reuters 27,
June, 2014 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-eu-factbox/what-is-ukraines-association-agreementwith-the-eu-idUSKBN0F20RM20140627
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A rank ordered correlation test using data from BEEPS IV-V shows that Russian
language and location5 are strongly correlated. Appendix II shows that locations with primarily
Russian-speaking respondents not surprisingly tended to vote for pro-Russian parliamentary
candidates. Of the 908 respondents speaking Russian, 555 of them were located where the proRussian “Party of Regions” had won the local 2012 parliamentary election. In comparison, all
but 5 of the 208 of those who responded in the local language (Ukrainian) were located where
the pro-European “All-Ukrainian” party won the 2012 parliamentary elections. This data
supports the decision to use the Russian language variable as a proxy to measure the impact of
Russian influence.
The results of this study show that speaking Russian in Ukraine had weak but statistically
significant effect on perceived corruption. Despite its low marginal significance, there can be
implications from this result. We can speculate whether speaking Russian in Ukraine leads to
this effect on perceived corruption due to direct or indirect influences by Russia.
Russia has been trying to increase its sphere of influence on some of its former sister
socialist republics. It has inserted itself into wars with Georgia after the dissolution of the
U.S.S.R and has illegally annexed Crimea, claiming it was the desire of its people. Russia also
has a hugely popular pro-government state-run television channel that generally reports on the
success and good intentions of its foreign policy. Russia has also given former Ukrainian
President Viktor Yanukovych refuge after his removal as President. This can be interpreted as
Russia actively protecting its interest within Ukrainian politics. Ukraine’s proximity to Russia
and its large Russian-speaking population make it a hotbed for nationalists and Russian

5

Appendix II cross-references the geographic location of each Oblast with the political party that won the 2012
parliamentary elections.

24

sympathizers to dispute the two nations’ place in world affairs. As of 2017, almost 10,000
Ukrainian civilians have died amongst heavy fighting from the ongoing crisis in eastern Ukraine
involving Russian-backed separatists trying to secede from Ukraine.6 Russia has provided
weapons and aid for the rebels fighting against the Ukrainian government and has moved
thousands of military soldiers onto its borders with Ukraine.7 With Russia inserting itself in so
many of Ukraine’s national affairs, it is possible that direct actions from Russia may be biasing
the expectations and perception of the Ukrainian government.
Indirectly, Russian values, culture, and expectations may be influencing perceptions as
well. Those born in Russia or to ethnic Russian families within Ukraine may grow up with
certain expectations of Russia. For example, a person born in Soviet Russia may remember their
homeland as a place of power and might, but now resides in a struggling Ukraine. Both
governments are equally corrupt according to Transparency International, but the expatriate
experiences Ukraine with a stagnated economy, weak central government, and a weak military.
This leads to the Russian speaker to speculate as to why Ukraine’s government is ineffective and
inferior to their expectations. The Russian-speaking respondent may perceive a failed
government in comparison to Russia.

Perceived corruption is a relative variable and a

respondent’s expectations are factors that contribute to their interpretation of corruption, and thus
their perception. In addition to expectations, a respondent’s culture may indirectly influence their
perception of corruption. Until 2017, the largest social media platform in Ukraine was the

6

Source: Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine 16 February to 15 May 2017. United
Nations, 2017, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner,
www.ohchr.org/documents/countries/ua/uareport18th_en.pdf
7

Source: Herszenhorn, David M, and Peter Baker. “Russia Steps up Help for Rebels in Ukraine War.”
The New York Times, 25 July 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/26/world/europe/russian-artillery-fires-intoukraine-kiev-says.html
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Russian version of Facebook called “VKontakte”.8 Social media has become more pervasive and
intrusive in our daily lives and with a Russian-based platform being the primary one in Ukraine,
it is possible that Russian-speaking citizens were exposed to biased marketing and information.
In 2017, the Ukrainian government banned VKontakte amongst other Russian websites for fear
of direct and indirect propaganda.9 The indirect effect of Russia’s bias on Ukraine may be more
damaging in the long-term than the direct effects. Russian-speaking Ukrainians’ perception of
Russia can create divisions in politics, trade, and government as well as in society amongst the
citizens.
This study supports the idea that the indirect effects of Russian influence is stronger than
the direct effects. This is shown by the marginal results for the percentage of a business foreignowned variable. The higher the percentage of a business that is foreign owned, the less likely the
respondent will perceive corruption at a higher level, meaning the more invested a foreigner is in
a business, the less corrupt they perceive the government to be. This supports the theory that
different nationalities or cultures may have different expectations of government. There is a
question of casualty in this theory. Do foreigners invest in Ukraine because they perceive less
corruption, or is corruption low because foreigners who are invested perceive it that way?
Despite the foreign-owned variable having the opposite effect that the Russian variable has on
perceived corruption, it does lend credence to the idea that a respondent’s previous expectations
are playing a role. The data does not provide which nationality the owners are from, so it is

8

Source: Sharkov, Damion. “Ukrainians Join Facebook by the Millions After Russian Social Media Ban.”
Newsweek, 20 June 2017, www.newsweek.com/ukranians-join-facebook-millions-russian-social-media-ban-627488.
9

Source: Sharkov, Damion. “Ukrainians Join Facebook by the Millions After Russian Social Media Ban.”
Newsweek, 20 June 2017, www.newsweek.com/ukranians-join-facebook-millions-russian-social-media-ban-627488.
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difficult to extract any specific information about these expectations versus Russian speaker’s
expectations. A study by Bondarev (2014) uses an earlier BEEPS to determine that foreignownership of a business in Ukraine has a positive link with corruption. Bondarev using an
instrument to control for endogeneity of foreign-owned business and corruption, determines that
an increase in foreign-ownership of a business increases the likelihood of higher corruption. His
study and ours vary in multiple ways including; time frame, control variables, and method of
testing, all which could attribute to the differing results. However, both studies find that foreignownership is a significant factor in perceiving corruption in Ukraine.
A struggling nation trying to create stability and economic growth can be easily
influenced. Both Russia and the EU have attempted to align Ukraine with their respective values.
This study illustrates the potential impact of Russian culture on perceived corruption. The impact
Russian speakers have on the perception of the Ukrainian government is important because
Russian speakers make up a large proportion of the country. If Ukraine can mitigate the Russian
influence, it can begin to create its own unbiased perceptions. This could help attract new
investments and economic aid from European neighbors.
It is important to note that the Russian-speaking Ukrainians’ increased likelihood of
perceiving corruption can have consequences. A respondent's actions may be implicitly affected
by their perceived corruption. A respondent who feels the government is highly corrupt may be
less likely to trust or rely on the government to perform its duties. This can impact the economic
decisions taken by these respondents and have tangible effects on the economy, the government,
and other people.
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- Limitations of Study
Firstly, this study uses the BEEPS dataset which, while groundbreaking, still relies on
self-reporting of illicit activities. Secondly, this study assumes that Russian language is an
instrument for the influence that Russia is imparting on Ukraine. While it is difficult to
empirically measure a foreign influence in a country, there may be more than one way to control
for it. Thirdly, this study does not address endogeneity that the female and foreign ownership
may have with perceived corruption.
The scope of this study only examines perceived corruption of respondents who are
employed. A larger demographic can be used to get more inclusive determination of the factors
that contribute to perceived corruption.
While this paper asserts that Russian-speaking Ukrainians are than 2.33% more likely to
have a higher level of perceived corruption than non-Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the same
circumstances, its results rely on perceived corruption being a truly accurate proxy for actual
corruption. Do those respondents influenced by Russia perceive actual corruption differently,
causing them to report a higher rating of corruption? Or are their perceptions derived from other
factors that are not related to corruption? The latter is possible if perceived corruption is not an
accurate proxy for actual corruption.
Future studies of perceived corruption in Ukraine could add additional elements such as
merging previous BEEPS datasets together to determine how stock perceived corruption affects
current perceived corruption. Future research could add other variables such as political
alignment, permit and licensing effects, and tax administration effects, although they must
account for endogeneity of those variables. A more rigorous model can be created with a more
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detailed dataset including: a variable for the nationality of business owners, reliable
export/import data, and data of ownership demographics. Further studies on corruption within
specific countries could yield results showing that corruption is caused by either systematic
factors, relative factors, or a combination of both. In Ukraine perceived corruption is perpetuated
by a combination of a relative factor, Russian influence, and common systemic factors such as
different expectations of foreign-owned business and political instability. Further study on this
subject could examine if Russian-speaking Ukrainians behave or act differently due to their
higher likelihood to perceive corruption. Do they make different economic choices? Do they
perceive other economic variables differently? A wider scope study can potentially provide some
answers.

VI. Conclusion
The Russian influence on Ukrainian politics is unlikely to dissipate in the near future
given their history and geography. Ukraine needs to take a variety of steps to ensure economic
certainty and sustainability, which is not a short-term process. In the short-term however, there
are actions Ukrainians could take collectively to lessen Russian influence and its effect on
perceived corruption. For example, Ukrainian politicians should form more stable and concrete
political parties. Whitmore (2014) notes that before being elected President, Petro Poroshenko
switched political allegiances four times, one of which was to the pro-Russian Party of Regions.
With clearly established political parties, Russian-speaking Ukrainians may identify the
Ukrainian political system as being more stable. Giving more autonomy to the Oblasts, regions
in Ukraine, would lessen the federal government’s impact on local economies. This might shift
policies toward ones that are more beneficial to local populations, increasing satisfaction among
29

those who feel the government is corrupt. Observation of industry and the interactions each
sector has with the government can provide insight as to why specific industries feel government
is more corrupt than others. Ukraine has a road map to the European Union if they choose to
follow the path of Croatia, Bulgaria, and their neighbor Romania. Ukraine’s unique geopolitical
situation lends extra importance for the need to create a stable and reliable government. Russianspeaking Ukrainians may always be a part of Ukrainian society and changing their perception on
corruption may be a hugely difficult task. However, reducing this perceived corruption could be
a big step for Ukraine towards encouraging investment and long-term economic growth.
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Appendix I: Impact of corruption on day-to-day operations by severity.

Source: BEEPS 2012-2014, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
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Appendix II: Location of Ukrainian Oblasts (States) and Political Party Elected in 2012
Parliamentary Elections
Location
Capital

Kyiv (AU)

Kyivska (AU)

North

Vinnystia (AU) Kivorohardska Poltava
(AU)
(AU)

Cherkasy
(AU)

Chernihivska
(AU)

South

Crimea (POR)

Kherson
(POR)

Sevastopol
(POR)

East

Dnipropetrovsk Donetsk
(POR)
(POR)

Zaphorizka Sumska(AU)
(POR)

West

Volynska (AU)

IvanoFrankivska
(AU)

Mykolaiv
(POR)

Zakarpatska
(SPLIT)

Odessa
(POR)

Kharkiv
(POR)

Khmelnystka Chernivetska Lviv
(AU)
(AU)
(AU)

POR- Party of Regions, Pro-Russian
AU- All-Ukrainian Party, Pro-European
Source: Ukraine Central Election Commission,
http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2012/wp005E?PT001F01=900
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Luhansk
(POR)

Ternipol Rivne
(AU)
(AU)

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Mean

Standard Deviation

Dependent Variable
Severity of Corruption

2.212925

1.358066

Russian Language

.7522784

.4318682

Industry

7.435791

4.53426

Relative City Size

3.193869

1.12952

Female Ownership

.4217067

.4940368

Foreign Ownership %

3.75145

17.02621

Business Size

87.52527

237.6978

Severity of Tax Rate

2.290804

1.321756

Severity of Instability

2.333057

1.385219

Explanatory Variables

N

1207
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Table 2: Results from Ordered Logit Regression
Corruption

Other Manufacturing

0
(.)

Food

0.619**
(0.025)

Textile

-0.245
(0.703)

Garments

0.655**
(0.018)

Chemicals

1.510**
(0.030)

Plastic/Rubber

-0.269
(0.682)

Metal Minerals

0.660**
(0.029)

Basic/Fabricated Metal

0.287
(0.449)

Machine & Equipment

0.481*
(0.079)

Electronics

0.387
(0.618)

Construction

1.092***
(0.009)

Other Services

0.289
(0.480)

Wholesale

0.993***
(0.009)

Retail

0.674**
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(0.017)
Hotel/Restaurant

0.678
(0.122)

Transport

1.798***
(0.004)

IT

0.632
(0.325)

Size of City

-0.0371
(0.459)

Russian Language

-0.239*
(0.066)

Female Dummy

-0.114
(0.312)

Foreign Ownership %

0.00934***
(0.005)

Firm Size

-0.000362
(0.115)

Tax Rate

0.548***
(0.000)

Political Instability

0.805***
(0.000)

cut1
Constant

0.978***
(0.005)

cut2
Constant

2.165***
(0.000)

cut3
Constant

3.626***
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(0.000)
cut4
Constant

5.255***
(0.000)

Observations

1207

p-values in parentheses
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3: Average Marginal Effects at means of Factor Variables on Corruption Overall, with Russian
Only, and Local Language Only Using Ordered Logit Regression

Other Manufacturing

Food

Textile

Garments

Chemicals

Plastic/Rubber

Metal Minerals

Basic/Fabricated Metal

Machine & Equipment

Electronics

Construction

Other Services

Wholesale

AME Corruption

AME Corruption
Russian Language

AME Corruption
Local Language

b/se

b/se

b/se

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

(.)

(.)

(.)

-0.0670**

-0.0627**

-0.0683**

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

0.0304

0.0288

0.0309

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

-0.0704**

-0.0659**

-0.0718**

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

-0.1380***

-0.1277***

-0.1412***

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

0.0336

0.0318

0.0341

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.09)

-0.0709**

-0.0664**

-0.0723**

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

-0.0329

-0.0309

-0.0335

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.04)

-0.0533*

-0.0500*

-0.0543*

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

-0.0436

-0.0409

-0.0444

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

-0.1084***

-0.1008***

-0.1107***

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.04)

-0.0330

-0.0310

-0.0336

(0.05)

(0.04)

(0.05)

-0.1005***

-0.0936***

-0.1026***

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.04)
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Retail

Hotel/Restaurant

Transport

IT

Size of City

Russian Language

Female ownership

Percentage of Foreign
Ownership

Firm Size

Tax Rate

Political Instability

Observations

-0.0722**

-0.0676**

-0.0736**

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

-0.0727

-0.0679

-0.0741

(0.05)

(0.04)

(0.05)

-0.1548***

-0.1428***

-0.1586***

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.04)

-0.0683

-0.0639

-0.0696

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.07)

0.0036

0.0034

0.0037

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.01)

0.0233*

0.0217**

0.0239*

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

0.0111

0.0104

0.0114

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

-0.0009***

-0.0008***

-0.0009***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

-0.0535***

-0.0497***

-0.0547***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

-0.0785***

-0.0729***

-0.0803***

(0.00)

(0.01)

(0.01)

1207

1207

1207
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